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REGINALD LEAMON ROBINSON* 
This panel focuses on split personalities, something we have all 
experienced and through which we have suffered. Part of what we 
will focus on is teaching and scholarship in nonstereotypical sub­
jects. We have an excellent panel with us today: Lisa Ikemoto will 
talk about race, class, gender, and sexual orientation as they relate 
to bio-ethics; Dorothy Brown will relate her comments to tax law; 
Carlos Cuevas will relate his comments to bankruptcy law; and 
Robert Wasson will relate his comments to general areas of law. I 
teach Property and so I will make a few remarks about that topic 
and also give you a little bit of personal history. 
"Split personalities": I think that is an appropriate way of 
framing what it is we have to experience when we enter the acad­
emy. "Split," because in many ways we live our entire lives trying 
to find that certain, sometimes very unsettled, space where we or 
our many personalities have to exist. We are really trying to move 
between what we want to be, what we feel we need to be, and what 
people expect us to be. I think this conflict, in many ways, awaits us 
when we enter the academy. 
I thought it was interesting yesterday that Jenny Rivera was 
talking about presente.1 We had comments from the floor that 
brought home the fact that when we show up, sometimes that, in 
and of itself, is presente. I think it is even more clearly presente 
when we show up and we have a commitment to doing something 
more than just getting our students through what may be consid­
ered a bar-related or doctrinal course. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.A., 1981, 
Howard University; M.A., 1983, University of Chicago; J.D., 1989, University of Penn­
sylvania Law School. 
1. "Presente" means "I am here." 
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Not only are our personalities split because we have to live our 
lives generally in that way, but they are split even more when we 
enter the academy. Many of us are shocked and surprised at this 
reality, and I can tell you, quite honestly, that I was not as fore­
warned as some of the panelists. I had to experience it directly and 
I can tell you it was very painful. 
I think that in addition to split personalities, we are talking 
about marginalized personalities. I want to talk about how that sort 
of marginalization relates to the institutional culture in which we 
find ourselves. I also want to relate marginalization to what stu­
dents do when they react to us and push us into that very unsafe, 
unsettled space where we have to quickly find what personality we 
need in order to deal with our present circumstances. 
So often I have heard Jerome Culp say, "All rules is local," and 
that is so true. We will relate different experiences to you today. 
Sometimes they will not fit perfectly with each and every institution 
at which some of you are teaching (suffering may be a better word) 
because every institution has its own degree of dysfunction, every 
institution has its own way of expressing that dysfunction, and 
therefore, every institution has its own way of trying to cope ade­
quately with our progressive mission. This pedagogical approach 
might, in many ways, unsettle what it is they are supposed to be 
doing. 
Let me talk about my experiences. I started teaching at Whit­
tier Law School in 1991. About two years later, I was a visiting 
professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law for a 
semester and then at the University of Connecticut School of Law. 
I have been on the faculty at Howard University for about two 
years. 
When I started teaching Property, I chose a textbook that did 
for me what I really wanted to do, which was to introduce race and 
gender in class. I also introduced sexual orientation issues through 
hypotheticals because the textbook did not do this very well. I 
thought that if I chose a textbook that had in it everything that I 
wanted it to have, I would not have to import that material. I 
would not have to have someone say: "This is Reggie's stuff." They 
could look in the textbook and say: "Well, it must be a relevant way 
of looking at the law because it's already in here." Singer's book on 
Property2 was not on the market yet, so I taught out of Richard 
2. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAC· 
TICES (1993). 
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Chused's textbook.3 
What I wanted to do initially was to frontload the course with a 
lot of social theory and philosophy. So I chose hotbed radicals that 
I thought would make the students all sort of boil in their seats­
Kant, Pufendorf, Bentham, Locke, Demsetz, Posner, Marx (but just 
a little bit), and then lastly, a very little Hegel. Well, they didn't like 
it, and they said so loudly; the line outside the dean's office was two 
rows deep, but I did it anyway. I then coupled that material with 
issues on property-as-culture. I thought this approach was simple 
material that the students needed to know because it was very im­
portant to their understanding that, as our cultural expectations and 
social needs change, so changes a property regime. As the old re­
gime dies, a new one crops up. Our discussion ought to be about 
whether or not it was a good thing to kill the old regime in light of 
something new. How good is the new regime; does it create more 
problems than it answers questions?4 Thereafter, we deal with the 
history of property. Again, this material is fairly easy. As you 
know, property has historical roots, and one of the cases I teach is 
Dred Scott.s I thought it was important to ask, as the book does: 
What is the appropriate subject of property law? In connection 
with this case, you can also teach about life estates and remainders. 
There is a wonderful footnote in the textbook that deals with that: 
If you can divide a person up, what would it look like over time?6 
You can also learn about the power to encroach, which is very im­
portant when you are looking at what the duties of a life tenant 
might be.7 Also, for many of us who have thought about it, we can 
all agree that Dred Scott was an important forerunner to the Chi­
nese exclusion cases8 which concerned the issue of who has the 
right to determine what citizenship is. Good stuff for property law, 
I thought-well, perhaps not. 
Let me give you some sense about the kinds of reactions I got 
from both my colleagues and my students. The first two things I 
will read to you are paraphrased comments I received from my col­
3. See RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 
(1988). 
4. See, e.g., International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); 
State V. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. 
Change, Inc. V. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
5. Dred Scott V. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
6. See CHUSED, supra note 4, at 163 n.76. 
7. See id. at 163. 
8. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting V. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping 
V. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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leagues. The first comment goes as follows: "Reggie, you can't 
teach these students the way you were trained at Penn. These. stu­
dents have special needs and are not that bright." Well I could not 
argue with that statement because that would mean that I would 
have to assume that I was just like the students. Although some of 
the students were affluent, my roots are not very different from 
many of the students at Whittier. 
Second, I will paraphrase a conversation I had with a 
colleague. 
Colleague: "I really don't want to be different. If you're different 
you get in trouble and I'm not sticking my neck out." 
My response: "So what you're saying to me is that if I'm different 
and if I get in trouble, you're not going to go to bat for me." 
Colleague: "That's right, you're on your own." 
The third example is from my student evaluations. Let me give 
you the context in which these students were probably thinking 
when they wrote these things to me-things that were quite painful. 
This caption runs along the top of the page. It reads: "This page is a 
nonconfidential page for comments, explaining your rating on the 
previous page or any nonconfidential comments you would like to 
make about the instructor for the course. This page will be avail­
able to the Faculty Personnel Committee for use in decisions affect­
ing the instructor." Now, with that in mind, they wrote the 
following. One student wrote: 
I don't feel that I'm learning the property laws and concepts that 
I will need to pass the bar, etc. We spent a lot of time discussing 
philosophers which don't seem to be relevant to the goals of the 
students. Much time in class is also spent "arguing" points, an 
endeavor which is needed as a lawyering skill but, perhaps, would 
be better confined to a class of its own. 
Scary! Next evaluation: 
Professor Robinson uses a book that spells "Black" with a capital 
"B" and "white" with a small "w," which is indicative of his gen­
eral attitude of reverse discrimination. White students in this 
class are made to feel gUilty for the injustices suffered by blacks, 
while black students seem to be receiving preferential treatment 
both inside and outside class. 
I angst! 
The fifth example before I get to my concluding remarks con­
cerns a conversation with a subcommittee of our Personnel Com­
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mittee. They had read these evaluations, and they wanted to find a 
way to help me to be much more effective in class. Their view was 
that if I wanted to be more "authentic" as a teacher, I must be 
someone who understands that the mission is doctrinal-teaching 
rules so that our students can ,be galvanized in the hard tools of 
legal reasoning and so that they ultimately will feel comfortable 
about passing the bar. They wanted to get rid of my "unauthentic" 
personality ~hat was walking around the class asking ugly questions, 
perhaps stupid, irrelevant questions, so that students would not 
have to have angst about what they thought or did not think. So 
they told me quite up front: "Don't teach Dred Scott; don't do it." I 
was flabbergasted. 
I had read an article before I came to Whittier. As a new pro­
fessor, you get that packet containing a lot of idealized information. 
You read it and say, "God, yes! I'll be just like that." I remember 
reading a little article which basically said that if a dean ever came 
into the class and instructed the professor on how to teach, the pro­
fessor would quit on the spot and go find another job. I thought, 
"Yeh, that's me!" Yeh, right! So I sat there, surprised and unable 
to believe it when they told me not to teach Dred Scott. When I 
asked them why, the only answer was that it will make the students 
feel uncomfortable. I thought: "But isn't that precisely what I 
ought to be doing? Shouldn't we make our students just a tad un­
comfortable if we are going to be successful in good, effective, long­
range teaching?" Answer: "No." I didn't listen to them-I taught 
it anyway. 
The last comment is also taken from a student evaluation and 
went as follows: 
I feel Professor Robinson is an excellent teacher who receives a 
lot of criticism which I know is based on factors outside of prop­
erty. Although we are in 1991, a lot of students just can't accept 
a strong, positive African-American professor who is intelligent 
and doing things differently. It's sad but true that racism is alive 
and well at Whittier Law School. 
I have used these examples, not only to foreshadow our subse­
quent discussions today, but also to talk about the difficulties of 
trying to be "authentic" and true to our teaching mission. That mis­
sion must be based, not only on the important needs of the institu­
tion, but also on the needs of the students directly in front of us and 
on our own academic and intellectual survival. 
Today, we have a panel who will perhaps discuss .the same 
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things I have discussed, but they will do so in different but equally 
compelling ways. Just as Berta Hernandez left us with words asking 
us to think about "the indivisibility of identity," let me just tell you 
how I have learned to cope with who and what I might be other 
than just a black person. I have yet to figure out exactly what that 
means without retreating to history and present-day social policy,9 
or to what it means to be a man.10 When I walk into a room and I 
turn out the lights and I do not touch myself, although I do not see 
what it is I might be, I still live-I still exist. This continued exist­
ence means that much of what I am has nothing to do with what it is 
I think I see or with what other people think they see in me. Thank 
you. 
9. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of 
Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986). 
10. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, 
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW 120-125 (1991). 
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LISA CHIYEMI IKEMOTO* 

SOME TIPS ON HOW TO ENDANGER THE WHITE MALE 

PRIVILEGE IN LAW TEACHING** 
I. ENDANGERING 
I am a Sansei woman, a third generation Japanese American 
woman. I was taught not to consider my identity as relevant to 
legal analysis. And yet my Asianness, my femaleness, and some­
times my lack of apparent (hetero )sexual orientation are relevant 
to those who judge my abilities to teach law or to do legal scholar­
ship. Jerome Culp has written about a double bind he has faced as 
a Black law professor. White students compel him to state his cur­
riculum vitae, to prove his right to teach a course to them. Yet Pro­
fessor Culp's students also deny the credibility of the 
autobiographical facts that he considers relevant-that he is "the 
son of a poor coal miner."l His colleagues deny the relevance and 
appropriateness of those facts.2 Perhaps similarly, most of my 
teachers, my students, and my colleagues have denied, in various 
ways, the relevance and appropriateness of meanings that I attach 
to being a Sansei woman, a woman of color, and a member of the 
communities of color; at the same time, they have retained the right 
and the power to attach their own meanings to my race and gender. 
I have been taught, more generally, that identity categories 
such as gender (meaning non-male), race (meaning non-white), and 
sexual orientation (meaning non-heterosexual) are usually irrele­
vant in legal analysis. The exceptions to the general rule for deter­
mining identity relevance come up in classes like constitutional law, 
but only for the equal protection portion of the course, employment 
discrimination, and any course which has the word "woman," "gen­
der" "race" "feminist" "discrimination" or sometimes "critical" ' , ,.
I use the present tense in describing this general rule because the 
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Professor Ikemoto teaches Property, 
Bioethics, Law & Medicine, Family Law, and Marital Property, and uses critical race 
theory and feminist critical theory in her scholarship and teaching. 
** The following version of the author's remarks has been edited and footnoted 
by the author. 
1. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teach­
ing: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539,539,543 (1991). 
2. See id. at 554. 
80 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:73 
spirit, if not the letter of the general rule, still prevails as the norm. 
This was brought home to me very recently. 
I hesitated to finish this essay because many others have writ­
ten about the reasons for and the methods of teaching the signifi­
cance of race, gender, class, and other social categories in law, as 
well as the experience of being a law teacher whose race and gender 
make these categories issues in the classroom.3 The points I wanted 
to make were very basic, and seemed to me to be redundant at best. 
But a colleague recently made a statement that I and others under­
stood to suggest that teaching torts and other "non-race" courses 
from a critical race theory perspective would somehow endanger 
the students. There was, fortunately, an outraged response. Yet it 
seemed to me that even among the outraged, the practice of includ­
ing race, particularly from a critical race theory perspective, in a 
"non-race" course, was desirable primarily as an alternative ap­
proach; it would be fine as long as most of us taught the "normal" 
way. While this view pays more respect to diversity values than a 
strict reading of the general rule, it leaves the spirit of the general 
rule intact. It preserves the power of those who claim the law is 
socially and politically neutral to say when and how race, gender, 
3. For a short and incomplete list of helpful articles, see Frances Lee Ansley, Race 
and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991); Taunya 
Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 137 (1988); Patricia A. 
Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring 
Connections, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 165 (1988); Ruth Colker, Teaching From a Feminist 
Perspective: An Occupational Hazard?, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 153 (1993); Kimberle 
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 
11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Culp, supra note 1; Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V. 
Ward, Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 323 
(1995); Peter Halewood, White Men Can't Jump: Critical Epistemologies, Embodiment, 
and the Praxis of Legal Scholarship, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1995); Angela P. Har­
ris, On DOing the Right Thing: Education Work in the Academy, 15 VT. L. REv. 125 
(1990); Bill Dng Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, 
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: 
Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); Margaret M. 
Russell, Beginner's Resolve: An Essay on Collaboration, Clinical Innovation, and the 
First-Year Core Curriculum, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. l35 (1994); Peter M. Shane, Why Are 
So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resistance to Diversity in Legal 
Education, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1033 (1990); Gerald Torres, Teaching and Writing: Curricu­
lum Reform as an Exercise in Critical Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 867 (1986); Stephanie M. 
Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 147 (1988); Donna E. Young, Two Steps Removed: The Paradox ofDiver­
sity Discourse for Women of Color in Law Teaching, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 270 
(1996). 
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and other social categories are relevant in the classroom and in the 
law.. 
At the First Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship 
Conference, we talked about how to teach race in courses that do 
not fit into the general rule. In other words, we talked about how 
to show the relevance of race in the formation and application of 
legal rules that are not about race in any way that is obvious. In our 
discussion, we assumed without saying so that race is not obvious in 
most legal rules and in most law courses because white privilege is 
the implicit, invisible norm.4 It is the norm built into the rules. 
And it is the norm built into the perspective we think of as the 
normal way of teaching. I state this point now because I am writing 
for a broader audience than the one attending the Conference. I 
also want to say that it was refreshing not to have to justify the need 
for the discussion; it was restful to be able to assume that we shared 
certain conclusions. The lack of need to justify and the ability to 
assume some shared perspective is part of what makes those who 
embrace the general rule privileged in law and law teaching. It is 
part of what privileges whiteness in law and law teaching. I believe 
that when we reach the point that teaching race, gender, sexual ori­
entation, class, and disability does not need to be justified, is not 
considered alternative, and is valued for the meanings attached by 
those not privileged by these categories, then we will be endanger­
ing privilege itself. 
II. BASICS 
Making race and other points of marginalization visible in a 
law course is a lot of work. Take the reading materials, for exam­
ple. A few textbooks now include materials that address race, gen­
der, sexual orientation, class, and disability. For example, I use 
Singer's text, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices,S in my 
property course. I have used course materials that do not make 
race and other categories explicit. In those courses, I have tried to 
use classroom discussion to raise questions about how race might 
have operated in a case, how gender norms shaped the formulation 
of a rule, and so on. I might try to bring in facts that the judge, the 
casebook author, or the rule edited out, and ask why those facts 
4. See generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISI­
BLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). 
5. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
(1993). 
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about race were edited out. But in those courses, it feels, and un­
doubtedly appears, that I am at odds with the materials. More im­
portantly, the fact that I am at odds with the materials is likely to 
appear as if I am imposing my personal views onto neutral materi­
als. In other words, the reading materials, and the fact that most of 
my colleagues are teaching that race is invisible, enables the stu­
dents to attach their own meaning to my identity. Reading materi­
als that raise the same questions I do legitimize my efforts to 
address these questions. And in the best moments, the race of each 
of us in the classroom becomes obviously valid. 
I often put together my own course materials. Obviously, this 
takes a great deal of time. It takes more time to compile readings 
that expressly address race, gender, sexual orientation, and class 
than it does to compile readings that express the "law-is-neutral" 
approach. There are few published texts to use as models. You 
have to critically evaluate the standard approaches to the course, 
and rethink the topic in order to figure out how to make the social 
issues apparently relevant.6 In addition, you have to do extra re­
search to identify and locate readings that accomplish those teach­
ing goals. I say "extra research" because contextualizing the course 
subject in a way that makes the social categories obvious often 
means taking an interdisciplinary approach. As a practical matter, 
that means cramming in a bit of history, sociological method, ~ci­
ence, and other areas. I believe that this extra work has enhanced 
my teaching and scholarship. But the fact that it takes so much 
additional effort to add context and use an interdisciplinary ap­
proach indicates how pervasive and deeply engrained acontextual, 
separatist analysis is at law. 
This work has costs. For example, the time it takes to rethink 
the topic and put the reading materials together might be spent 
writing articles that would get more credit at promotion and tenure 
time, or perhaps, better salary increases. Teaching from an "alter­
native" perspective often has political costs. My guess is that teach­
ing from an "alternative" perspective can reinforce the authority of 
those who teach the so-called "normal" way. Or the fact that you 
6. Of course, it is a good idea to start by contacting others who might be teaching 
the same course using a similar approach. Sharing ideas, reading lists, and syllabi saves 
a lot of time. I recently found a very good article by Karen Rothenberg, someone I 
know, about teaching bioethics from a feminist perspective. Had I talked with her ear­
lier, I coul(j have saved myself time and benefitted from her wisdom. See Karen H. 
Rothenberg, New Perspectives for Teaching and Scholarship: The Role of Gender in 
Law and Health Care, 54 MD. L. REV. 473 (1995). 
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are teaching that race and gender are relevant may be perceived as 
threatening to the authority of others, as well as to the authority of 
majority viewpoints. This can negatively affect both teaching evalu­
ations and relations with some students and colleagues. You may 
have to use political capital to defend your teaching. Or you may 
simply lose your political capital. 
Finally, this work takes a lot of emotional energy. As I have 
indicated, your identity becomes an openly acceptable site of con­
testation. The identities of everyone in the classroom, but particu­
larly the identities of those marked different by our social 
categories, become sites of contestation. Talking about race, gen­
der, sexual orientation, class, and disability makes everyone uncom­
fortable. Some react negatively and even harmfully to this 
discomfort. And it is, in my experience, easier to do this work 
badly than it is to do it well. I do not think that I have ever quite 
succeeded in doing this work well; I have had a few good moments, 
a lot of ineffective moments, and too many bad moments. 
So why do I do this work? My personal reasons are fairly sim­
ple and straightforward. One reason is accuracy. Showing that 
race, gender, and other social norms shape the formation and oper­
ation of law is descriptively accurate. That my colleagues and stu­
dents may disagree with me at least raises the possibility that one's 
understanding of how the legal system operates has political con­
tent and is shaped by personal perspective and experience. A sec­
ond reason is closely linked to the first that I mentioned. I hope 
that some students will embrace a critical viewpoint and continue to 
question the normative content and effect of the law in their other 
classes and in their careers. A third very important reason for do­
ing this work is to provide space and validation for those students 
who already have a critical consciousness and feel marginalized in 
their other classes because of that, and for those students of color, 
women, gay men, and lesbians who experience the hostility and si­
lencing of the white heteropatriarchal culture that operates in most 
classrooms. Finally, I am trying to create space for myself within 
the law school. 
The "how to" part of my discussion is very basic. As I men­
tioned, others have articulated both reasons for and methods of 
making social norms visible in law. Certainly, there is a great deal 
more to write about why and how we can teach law in the context 
of social reality as experienced by those marginalized by it. But I 
want to address a few "how to" points that are so basic, they seldom 
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show up in print. To be as concrete as possible, I will use examples 
from my bioethics course. 
A. Selecting Reading Materials 
As I compile the reading materials for this course, I try to in­
clude materials that describe and use the dominant bioethics analyt­
ical framework, which is premised on liberal individualism, and 
materials that critique that framework. For the latter, I use read­
ings to provide contextual information that raise questions about 
assumptions within the dominant approach, and I use readings that 
do critical analysis. For example, the first set of readings examine 
the doctrine of informed consent. In that group of readings, I in­
clude a few standard cases to describe the legal doctrine, a study 
that compares European-Americans, African-Americans, Mexican­
Americans, and Korean-Americans, and shows that cultural and ra­
cial differences among these groups mediate understandings of au­
tonomy and methods of medical decisionmaking.7 I also include an 
excerpt from the President's Commission report on health care de­
cisions that documents how the same medical information carries 
different weight with patients depending on how it was presented,S 
and excerpts from Sue Fisher's book, In the Patient's Best Interest, a 
linguistic study that reveals the effects of gender, class, education, 
and expertise in structuring obstetrics/gynecology doctor-patient 
relations.9 
During classroom time, I try to use these materials to discuss 
whether, and how, the legal concept of autonomy that premises in­
formed consent might be gendered and ethnocentric in construction 
and application. I also discuss how race, gender, class, education 
levels, the physical setting (typically it is a clinic, hospital, or doc­
tor's offices, the doctor's domain), and the use of language can 
structure doctor-patient relations. I refer to Sue Fisher's concept of 
the contextual web, and we draw the web on the chalkboard as a 
group exercise. I often tell about how I experienced a cervical can­
7. See Leslie J. Blackhall et aI., Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Patient Autonomy, 
274 JAMA 820 (1995); see also Barbara A. Koenig & Jan Gates-Williams, Understand­
ing Cultural Difference in Caring for Dying Patients, 163 W.J. MED. 244 (1995). 
8. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: 
THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT­
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, vol. III (Oct. 1982); see also Sara Fritz, Patients Seldom 
Pick Their Treatment, Professor Finds, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at A29. 
9. See SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST (1990). 
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cer scare that I had as a result of a positive pap smear, and the 
conversations I had with my doctor about the diagnosis and treat­
ment process that followed. I try to talk about how my race and 
gender and that of the doctor (white, male) mediated these events, 
so that the links between my personal story and readings become 
obvious. I use the account to try to demonstrate the relevance of 
personal experience and how personal narrative can be used as an 
analytical tool. I try to encourage students to use their experience 
as more than an anecdote, but at the same time, I try not to pres­
sure them to reveal personal information. 
During our panel discussion, Professor Robinson suggested 
front-loading the readings with a group of theory materials. This is 
an effective approach, but currently I take a different approach. I 
mix the readings on theory throughout the course materials. I take 
this approach in part to show that theory, context, and legal doc­
trine are not separate categories of legal work. I also do this be­
cause it makes the theory less intimidating and more digestible for 
those students who resist theoretical analysis. In addition, I simply 
find it difficult to discuss the theory without the contextual 
materials. 
B. Selecting Students 
I am less interested in having students who have a pre-existing 
interest in the subject matter of the course than in having students 
who are willing to engage in conversation about how racism, for 
example, might or might not operate in the legal rules we are study­
ing, without being obstructive or oppressive. I do not (and cannot) 
directly select the students enrolled in the courses I teach. I do try 
to start the semester in a way that accomplishes two things. I try to 
make it clear that we will be engaging in critical inquiry that ad­
dresses how race, gender, class and other social categories operate 
at law. I review the course syllabus and open a substantive discus­
sion during the first class so that this approach is on the table at the 
outset. In this way, I hope to encourage those students who are 
resistant to critical thinking to either open their minds or drop the 
course. 
In bioethics, I have taken two different tacks in choosing an 
opening discussion. As mentioned, I usually begin the course with 
the informed consent materials. Since the students are already fa­
miliar with the doctrine and have had personal experience as pa­
tients, the topic is easy to broach. In other semesters, I use material 
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that makes many students uncomfortable. I might use a topic that 
is unfamiliar or sensitive. Or, as discussed below, I have used Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein. lO While most students are familiar with the 
story, they are unaccustomed to using a literary text in law school. 
There may be some students who think this is simply too strange, 
too unsettling, too non-doctrinal for them. If they are not willing to 
be unsettled, I hope they drop the course. 
I try to set a tone for open, critical, and constructive engage­
ment, but at the same time, I also try to make it clear that we are 
not going to discuss whether racism, patriarchy, heterosexism, and 
other systems of subordination exist. I try to convey that we can 
talk about how racism expresses itself, how it harms or privileges 
individuals, groups, and ourselves, and whether racism is operating 
in a particular situation. Hopefully, this starting point weeds out 
hostile students. II 
If your goal is to speak to the unconverted, then you may not 
want to take this approach. You may want to target those students 
who are consciously or unconsciously hostile to inquiry that ques­
tions the assumption of legal neutrality, either for the purpose of 
raising their consciousness or for the purpose of using them as foils. 
As I mentioned, my priority reason for doing this work in the class­
room is to provide a space for students marginalized in other areas 
of legal education. I do not try to provide a space with no opposi­
tion, just one with smaller margins. 
C. Exposing Norms 
I try to start each of my courses with a discussion that exposes 
how consistently and unconsciously we bring social norms to bear in 
analytical thinking. My initial goal is to begin a conversation in 
which we learn how to recognize and articulate the operation of 
these norms. My larger goal is to prompt students to think about 
how legislators, judges, lawyers, and we ourselves create and apply 
law with normative content. I start with simple examples. In 
bioethics, I often use Mary Shelley's Frankenstein as a text for be­
ginning this discussion. As a preface to the discussion, I tell the 
students that many regard Frankenstein as the first story, or the 
10. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Maurice 
Hindle ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1818). I usually assign the introduction, written by 
Maurice Hindle, as well as the story. 
11. In the worst case scenario, a hostile student may decide to remain in the 
course for the purpose of actively obstructing critical inquiry. 
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genesis, if you will, of the science fiction genre. I provide a bit of 
background information about Mary Shelley and the romantic era 
in which she wrote. I then ask the students to break into small 
groups to discuss a series of questions: How are "science," "na­
ture " "scientist" "law" "human" "civilization" "man" and "wo­, " , " 
man" portrayed in the novel? We then regroup as a class to report 
and further discuss the questions. In the context of the novel, the 
students seem to have no trouble identifying and addressing the 
normative content of the concepts I have asked about. During the 
large group discussion, comparisons to contemporary understand­
ings of these concepts inevitably arise. In the best conversations, 
we are able to begin raising questions that suggest ways in which 
scientific knowledge is socially constructed. 
The story of Frankenstein works particularly well to identify 
ways in which patriarchy and racism affect social relations. For ex­
ample, while the humans in the story are white and for the most 
part Swiss, the creature is clearly an outsider. Students are usually 
able to identify racist norms in how Mary Shelley depicts the crea­
ture; she consistently describes him as "dark." The female charac­
ters are mostly morally good, hyperfeminized according to 
contemporary standards, and lack depth relative to the key male 
characters in the story. These points can be used to raise questions 
of how race and gender affect our understanding of what it means 
to be "human." 
I tell the students the reasons I use Frankenstein as a text. 
Frankenstein is often used as a metaphor in public discussions about 
science and medicine. I want the students to feel free to use such 
metaphors, to use popular culture in class, but to do so in a way that 
evaluates their role and identifies their normative content. I ask the 
students to think about the role of stories in ethical, policy, and 
legal analysis, and I ask them to identify other writings that might 
serve as texts for bioethics. I also ask the students to consider this 
question in the context of a bioethical dilemma they are probably 
already familiar with, such as surrogacy. I try to surface stories 
about mothers, fathers, family, and the lines between natural and 
artificial that have been embedded in both the public debate and 
the legal analysis of surrogacy. While this might sound clear and 
coherent in print, typically the classroom discussion is very unstruc­
tured and confusing to some. My hope is that the substance and the 
structure (or lack thereof) of the discussion will loosen up precon­
ceptions about law and medicine, ethics, analysis, and the social re­
lations embedded in each of these concepts. 
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CONCLUSION 

I think it is probably clear that how I teach springs directly 
from who I am-a Sansei woman, a woman of color, a member of 
the communities of color. I have not always taught this way. Nor 
does my experience of racism, heteropatriarchy, and economic in­
justice inform every aspect of my world view or my teaching. In 
many respects it is easier to teach a doctrinal, liberal realism per­
spective only; that perspective is acceptable and familiar and there­
fore, safer and easier. Teaching critical inquiry can be controversial 
and emotionally exhausting. I am always trying to overcome fear of 
causing controversy, insecurity about the effectiveness of my teach­
ing methods, and a desire to take the less strenuous route (i.e., basic 
laziness). But I tell myself that if everyone likes what you are doing 
as a teacher, you are either doing something wrong or the world has 
changed, and right now, the former is more likely. 
89 1997] SPLIT PERSONALITIES 
DOROTHY A. BROWN* 
SPLIT PERSONALITIES: TAX LAW AND CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY** 
The following is a mythical conversation: 
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I don't think that there can be a 
black legal income tax law or a black economics separate from 
white economics. Should blacks have additional deductions to 
take account of racism? Or should there be a longer period for 
blacks to file their returns because many of their ancestors were 
slaves? 
[JEROME CULP]: I don't know if blacks should have more deduc­
tions than whites, I haven't made a detailed study of how the in­
come laws impact blacks. 
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Not enough is known. Certainly, 
we could help to do more and better studies on blacks and income 
taxes, but I take it that is not Black Legal Scholarship. 
[SECOND WHITE COLLEAGUE]: There aren't very many blacks 
who teach tax law or do research in that area. Is that part ofyour 
point? 
[JEROME CULP]: Yes. But my point is more complex. My tax col­
leagues have stated these arguments in their most negative terms. 
There may be a [sic] income tax problem that would benefit from 
being viewed in a black perspective, but until you look, how will 
anyone know? To what extent have our tax laws been distorted 
now and historically by the question of slavery and continuing 
racism?1 
Although the above conversation never took place, it had a 
profound impact on my thinking. When I read Professor Jerome 
Culp's challenge,2 I knew that it was one which I had to accept. 
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.S., 1980, Ford­
ham University; J.D., 1983, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., 1984, New 
York University School of Law. lowe a tremendous thanks to Mr. Mark Carozza and 
the Institute for Policy Research for their excellent research support. I would also like 
to especially thank Professors Karen Brown and Mary Lou Fellows for their continued 
support and encouragement. I dedicate this work to Professor Jerome Culp, whose 
vision created the space for this work. 
** The following version of the author'S remarks has been edited and footnoted 
by the author. 
1. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Origi­
nal Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39,101. The quoted material is "[a] mythical con­
versation in Duke Law School Faculty Lounge shortly after Toward a Black Legal 
Scholarship was completed and circulated." Id. at 99. 
2. See id. at 105 ("everyone has to do black scholarship if it is to succeed"). 
90 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:73 
Ever since that day, I have dedicated myself to exploring issues of 
race and ethnic origin in my tax courses and scholarship. The focus 
of this speech will be federal income taxation, or the tax treatment 
of individuals. More specifically, this speech will focus on both the 
marriage penalty'paid and the marriage bonus received by married 
couples. 
I have been thinking about these issues since 1991, yet I have 
just begun to write about them. That is a function of the classes 
that I have taught over my brief five years in the legal academy. I 
taught Partnership Tax for three years and was unable to unmask 
the racial and ethnic issues in that course. I taught Deferred Com­
pensation once and didn't really attempt to unmask those issues, 
since my scholarship interests lie elsewhere. It wasn't until the fall 
of 1994 when I began teaching the courses I wanted to teach, 
namely Tax Policy and Federal Income Taxation, that I put on my 
"race lenses," as Professor James Hackney has described it, and 
went looking to unmask the racial implications of the federal in­
come tax system. 
Unmasking racial and ethnic issues in the federal tax laws is a 
difficult and arduous task. Very few scholars have attempted to 
publish in this area.3 I understand why that phenomenon has oc­
curred. First, tax law has a myth about it that suggests that it is 
different than other areas of the law.4 My tax colleague at Cincin­
nati, Professor Paul Caron, has eloquently referred to this phenom­
enon as "tax myopia," and observed that there are "serious 
consequences caused by the ... myth that tax law is somehow dif­
ferent from other areas of the law."5 One such consequence is per­
3. But see Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in 
TAXING AMERICA 45, 45-57 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (dis­
cussing the differences between black and white households concerning their payment 
of the marriage penalty or their receipt of the marriage bonus); Beverly I. Moran & 
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 
751 (discussing the differences between black and white households concerning the tax 
treatment of wealth); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) 
(acknowledging the differences between black and white women that previously have 
been ignored by tax scholars). 
4. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to 
be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994). 
5. Id. at 518. See also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The 
Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
637,637 (1996) (Wherein author observes: "I previously have criticized what 1 call 'tax 
myopia'-the tendency of the tax law to view itself as an isolated body of law separate 
from other areas of law." (footnote omitted». Additional authors have also observed 
the tax myopia phenomenon. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING 
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petuating the myth that tax law is neutral and ·objective. To the 
extent that tax law is assumed to be different, it is not examined the 
way other areas of the law have been examined through racial and 
ethnic lenses.6 To the extent that tax law is assumed to be different, 
any disparate impact based upon race or ethnicity will continue un­
abated. My scholarship is dedicated to forever eradicating the be­
lief that tax law is somehow different, that it has no differing impact 
based upon race, ethnicity, or any other characteristic.7 
Taxation is the result of a body of law including congressional 
statutes, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the 
"Code"), interpretive agency pronouncements, and judicial deci­
sion-making.8 Given that description, it is no surprise that tax laws 
will have differing impacts based upon race, gender, and other de­
fining characteristics. Knowing that race matters and proving that 
race matters, however, are separate endeavors. 
In order to unmask how race operates in the tax laws, I had to 
begin outside of the federal tax laws. I have consulted historical, 
political, and sociological materials, to name a few. I have become 
relentless in the pursuit of information. I find myself talking to 
complete· strangers on airplanes the minute I find out that they are 
involved in one of the above-mentioned areas. I have found ob­
taining information in those areas just as difficult as it has been un­
masking the racism that operates in the tax laws. 
I believe that there is an important story to tell, just with re­
spect to the difficulty of obtaining information. For example, the 
Internal Revenue Service does not keep tax return data by race.9 I 
am not suggesting that it is a good idea for revenue agents to know 
the racial or ethnic identity of a taxpayer when deciding when to 
AMERICA, supra note 3, at 25, 26 (Stating that "tax fictions can be dangerous. They can 
mask underlying motives and biases and they can cause unforeseen hanns."). 
6. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539; Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have 
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 
(1991). 
7. Legal scholarship exists on the relationship between sexual orientation and tax 
law. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 97 (1991). 
8. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUC­
TURE AND POLICY 6-14 (1995). 
9. Telephone Interview with John Kaminsky, IRS Statistics Branch (Nov. 8, 1996) 
(stating that the IRS does not ask for any racial identity infonnation). 
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audit that taxpayer. What I am saying is that if I cannot uncover 
data as to who pays taxes by racial and ethnic identity, I will never 
be able to rise to Professor Culp's earlier challenge. The good news 
is that the Census Bureau collects more data than you will probably 
ever have time to analyze. It is that data base and an angel in the 
form of Mark Carozza, who works at the Institute for Policy Re­
search at the University of Cincinnati, that have enabled me to do 
the preliminary work that I have done. 
The United States Census Bureau collects household informa­
tion data by race and ethnic identity. The Bureau's individual 
records are available in the Public Use Micro-Data Sample. As I 
state in my forthcoming book chapter entitled The Marriage Bonus/ 
Penalty in Black and White, I found that black couples are more 
likely to pay a marriage penalty and white couples are more likely 
to receive a marriage bonus,lo The marriage bonus/penalty analysis 
is a result of the convergence of three different factors, namely: how 
the Code is written and interpreted; the employment discrimination 
experienced by black workers and white women in the labor mar­
ket; and the differing marriage rates of black and white women. 
Let us examine each in turn. 
First, the tax laws. The disparate impact of the marriage bo­
nus/penalty is attributable to three tax principles. The Code allows 
married couples to file joint returns.ll Husbands and wives can al­
locate up to one-half of their income to a non-working spouse and 
have that assigned income taxed at a rate lower than if that spouse 
were single.12 That lower tax liability is referred to herein as a mar­
riage bonus. The Code rewards those families whose income is 
earned by only one spouse. 
Alternatively, if husbands and wives both work, and earn 
roughly equal amounts, they will pay taxes as a couple that is con­
siderably higher than those they would pay as single adults,l3 That 
higher tax liability is referred to herein as the marriage penalty. 
The Code penalizes those families with two wage earners. I would 
note that for purposes of the Code, who is married and eligible to 
10. See Brown, supra note 3, at 45. Although a more complete analysis would 
take into account racial and ethnic differences affecting Hispanic-American, Asian­
American, and Native-American families, the book chapter was a preliminary step in 
that direction. 
11. See I.R.C. § l(a) (1994). Joint returns are not mandatory and the alternative 
of filing "married filing separately" is available. 
12. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 138. 
13. See id. at 139. 
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file a joint return is determined by reference to state law.14 That 
makes same-sex and opposite-sex couples only eligible for joint fil­
ing status if recognized as married under state or local law. 
The second tax principle that is a factor in this analysis is that 
the Code taxes income at progressive rates. As a result, the mar­
riage penalty is the highest on the two-income family that earns 
roughly equal amounts of income.Is The second wage earner's first 
dollar of income is added on top of the spouse's salary and taxed at 
the spouse's highest marginal tax rate. The second wage earner 
does not receive the benefit of the lower tax rate that was applied 
to the spouse's first dollar of wage income. Progressive tax rates 
penalize the second wage earner. Alternatively, to the extent that 
there is only one wage earner in the household, progressive tax 
rates coupled with the joint tax return provisions afford that house­
hold a marriage bonus. 
The third tax principle is that the judiciary allows the value of 
services, such as child care, provided by family members to the 
household to go untaxed. I6 As a result, those three principles result 
in marriage tax penalties and marriage bonuses. A married couple 
can pay a higher tax when they marry or receive a reduced tax lia­
bility when they marry. The Code is not marriage neutral, and as 
previously mentioned, my research indicates that the marriage pen­
alty couple is more likely to be black, and the marriage bonus 
couple is more likely to be white. This is not because the Code 
explicitly limits its penalties to blacks and bonuses to whites, but 
because the Code operates in the context of larger societal issues. I 
will next address those larger societal issues, namely employment 
discrimination and differing marriage rates. 
I will focus on two aspects of employment discrimination, spe­
cifically, wage discrimination and differing labor participation rates. 
First, "[f]or every dollar earned by a white man, a white woman 
earned 78¢, a black man earned 74.8¢, and a black woman earned 
66¢."17 Second, the labor force participation rates of married wo­
men differ according to race. In 1990, "73 percent of married black 
14. See 4 BORIS I. BfITKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN­
COME, ESTATES AND GIFTS '11111.3.6 (1992); Cain, supra note 7, at 97; Toni Robinson & 
Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Deter­
minant,8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 792-95 (1989). 
15. See John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo II, A Historical Analysis of the "Marriage 
Tax Penalty," 21 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 163, 166 (1994). 
16. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 3, at 1576. 
17. Brown, supra note 3, at 52 (footnotes omitted). 
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women were in the waged labor force, compared to 64 percent for 
married white women. "18 The labor force participation rates for 
men have declined over the past twenty years, but this decline has 
been greater for black men than for white men,19 
Finally, we observe differing marriage rates. Thirty-six percent 
of black women· and sixty-eight percent of white women were in 
married-couple households in 1990.20 Assuming that taxes affect 
behavior, including the decision to marry,21 could the tax laws be 
operating in a way that discourages black women from marrying 
and encourages white women to marry? Additional empirical work 
needs to be done, but I suggest that it will yield some fruitful 
results. 
Now we are ready to examine how the convergence of the tax 
principles, employment discrimination, and differing marital rates 
result in black couples being more likely to pay a higher marriage 
penalty and white couples being more likely to receive a marriage 
bonus. As a result of wage discrimination, black men and women 
earn wages closer in amounts than white men and women. This 
assumes, however, that black men marry black women and white 
men marry white women. Given that interracial marriages are still 
rare, this is a safe assumption.22 In addition, more black married 
women are in the labor force. Accordingly, black couples ar~ more 
likely to have household income split roughly equal. Given that the 
greatest marriage penalty exists in households where two wage 
earner couples earn equal amounts, married black couples, with a 
higher percentage of two wage earners, with salaries closer than 
white couples, are more likely to pay a marriage penalty than white 
couples. 
Yet an additional factor in the analysis is that most black wo­
18. Id. at 49. 
19. See id. at 51. The decline in labor participation rates for younger, white men 
has been attributed to advanced educational opportunities. See BETTE WOODY, BLACK 
WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: IMPACTS OF STRUcruRAL CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY 147 
(1992). 
20. See Reynolds Farley, The Common Destiny of Blacks and Whites: Observa­
tions about the Social and Economic Status of the Races, in RACE IN AMERICA 197,212 
(Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993). 
21. See James AIm & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income. Tax Affect Marital 
Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565,571 (1995) (finding that "the probability of marriage 
falls as the marriage tax increases"). 
22. See Robert O. Wood, Marriage Rates and Marriageable Men: A Test of the 
Wilson Hypothesis, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 163, 172 (1995) (reporting that "in 1985, 
98.9 percent of black married women and 96.6 percent of black married men had a 
black spouse"). 
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men are not married, and most white women are married. There­
fore, most black women receive neither the marriage penalty nor 
the marriage bonus. Recall the question I posed earlier: Does the 
Code playa role in the marriage decision? As heads-of-house­
holds, black women are disproportionately poor.23 Eighty percent 
of families headed by black women were in poverty, while fifty-five 
percent of families headed by white women were in poverty.24 
White men and women earn wages further apart in amounts. 
Therefore, even if they pay a marriage penalty, it will not be nearly 
as great as black couples. Given that 74.8¢ is closer to 66¢ than 78¢ 
is closer to one dollar, black couples are more likely to pay a higher 
marriage penalty than white couples. 
Is it just a coincidence that the most penalized married couple 
would be that of a black man and a white woman? Seventy-eight 
cents is even closer to 74.8¢ than those wages of a black married 
couple. In that household, however, white women would make 
more than their black male husbands. 
As a result of wage discrimination, white males earn the high­
est salaries. One dollar can buy more than the 74.8¢ black men can 
earn. White men can more economically afford to provide for their 
families based upon their salaries alone. Accordingly, white wives 
do not have to work for the family to survive economically, and if 
they do work, they will receive less wages, again a result of employ­
ment discrimination. Those two instances of discrimination, cou­
pled with the exclusion from taxable income of the value of the 
services that wives provide for the family, provide incentives for 
white women to work inside the home, and for the family to receive 
a marriage bonus.25 As noted earlier, we observe that married 
white women are not in the labor force to as great an extent as 
married black women. 
Although far more research needs to be done, it seems clear 
that the Code has a different impact on black and white households 
where both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses are analyzed. 
Although the Code did not cause the societal racism that results in 
employment discrimination and differing marriage rates, the Code 
is operating to exacerbate that racism by penalizing black couples 
and benefitting white couples. Accordingly, the Code's role in rein­
forcing societal racism must be challenged and eliminated. 
23. See Farley, supra note 20, at 213-17. 
24. See id. 
25. See Brown, supra note 3, at 53. 
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I will conclude with a brief discussion of how I teach sensitive 
issues involving racial and ethnic identity. First, I have only re­
cently begun to explore issues of race and tax law, and anticipate 
incorporating some of these ideas in my Tax Policy course this Fall. 
What I have always done in Tax Policy that has met with the most 
resistance, however, is to critique the print media. I generally find 
newspaper clippings on relevant tax topics, and proceed to rip apart 
the newspaper articles in class. I encourage the students to do the 
same. What I have observed is that those who agree with the Wall 
Street Journal don't like it when I rip the Journal's views apart, and 
those who agree with the New York Times don't like it when I rip 
apart the Times's views. Yet, by the time the semester is complete, 
I find less resistance, given that I am an equal opportunity criticizer. 
I manage to annoy all of my students. That's when I know that I 
have had a good semester. As an aside, I also know whether I have 
had a good semester outside of the classroom by counting the 
number of colleagues that I have managed to annoy. In the five 
years that I have spent in the legal academy, I have had an ex­
traordinary number of good semesters both inside and outside of 
class. 
In my State and Local Finance course, which I have taught for 
five years, I spend a few weeks carefully examining education fund­
ing cases. Those cases involve issues of race and ethnicity, taxes 
and education-a fairly volatile mix. So it is important that I set a 
respectful tone early in the semester, which I do by inviting stu­
dent's views, but challenging them to unmask their underlying as­
sumptions-but doing so with the utmost respect for those 
assumptions. I find students are as respectful to you as you are to 
them. 
In the early part of the State and Local Finance course, we 
don't touch upon racially sensitive matters, but we do touch upon 
politically sensitive matters-which are often just as volatile. At 
the first class, we discuss which branch of government the student's 
fear the most: the federal, state, local, or judiciary. When students 
respond (and they do respond) I seek to get them to understand 
that their colleagues' views are just as important, and just as biased 
as their own. The biases come out slowly, but they come out. 
usually unmask the biases by challenging their underlying beliefs. I 
ask, "What is your cite for that proposition?" When they concede 
that they have no cite, but that it is based upon personal observa­
tions, that is an important moment in class. I ask them if they can 
understand how that might not be persuasive to those with different 
I 
97 1997] SPLIT PERSONALITIES 
experiences, different personal observations. How will you reach 
them? What if those with different experiences are the judges con­
sidering your client's case? How can you best represent your client 
given the judiciary's bias? Of course, this assumes that we spend a 
good part of the semester critically evaluating the court's decisions. 
Students react in a variety of ways to the process, however. 
They tend to be rather cynical by the time I get them and actually 
enjoy shooting at judicial decisions. They tend to like this exercise 
less when the judge has the same bias that they have, although 
rarely do they see it as a bias until a colleague points it out in the 
class discussion. They usually resist. I don't try to change their 
minds. I just ask, "Do you see how your belief is formed upon an 
assumption that others may not share? That if you continue to 
make arguments based upon that unshared assumption you may 
lose your audience?" That is the most that I can hope for. I have 
however, had the gratifying experience of having my students come 
to me after the semester is over and say that I made them think 
about things they never thought about. It is such moments that 
make this process worthwhile. 
To summarize, I recommend putting your race lenses on, re­
lentlessly exposing the disparate impact that your intuition tells you 
is there in whatever subject you teach, and surrounding yourselves 
with .scholars· that are supportive of your work. Thank you and 
happy hunting. 
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CARLOS CUEVAS* 

My name is Carlos Cuevas and I teach at New York Law 
School. Before I begin my comments, I would like to thank Profes­
sor Leonard Baynes and Western New England College School of 
Law for hosting this Conference and my colleagues for letting me 
participate in this interesting panel. 
I teach Article 9, which encompasses secured transactions, 
bankruptcy, and corporate reorganization. The first time I taught 
the bankruptcy course, it was during the day and I had approxi­
mately 50 students. For the last three years my bankruptcy course 
has been basically sold out. My average day enrollments have been 
110 for bankruptcy and secured transactions, which are both elec­
tives at my school. I also teach a seminar in corporate reorganiza­
tion which has an enrollment of 25 people. 
I start the beginning of each course by writing a phrase on the 
board: THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE. The reason I put that 
phrase on the board is to let the students know that I am there 
because I want to be there. I take my job very seriously and the 
same expectations the students have of me, I have of them. We are 
in a special profession. Although you may not think that you deal 
with life and death, at some point in time you will. Therefore, you 
have to learn how to do the smallest task, as well as the most impor­
tant task, to the best of your ability. This point deals subliminally 
with the competency issue. From the moment I get to the class­
room, I want the students to know that I take my job very seriously 
and that I am not the so-called "token" on the faculty. 
I also deal with teaching materials differently. You see, unlike 
property law, for which a text that dates from 1940 would for the 
most part be basically modern, the areas of the law in which I teach 
evolve rapidly. I revise my course materials for corporate reorgani­
zation and for bankruptcy every six months because the law in 
these areas basically evolves every six months. I want students to 
know that I am teaching them what is current. 
The other thing that I try to do in the classroom is to set a 
tenor that encourages dialogue, and to engage students in that dia­
logue. The first time I taught corporate reorganization, there was 
one person of color in the classroom. Now, my average enrollment 
of people of color is between 20 to 25 percent. I think that one of 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1979, New York University; 
J.D., 1982, Yale Law School. 
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the reasons I have been successful is that I call on people. I do not 
want there to be silent voices in the classroom. I want the students 
to know that they have paid their money just like everyone else and 
they are entitled to a decent education, and to the best education I 
can give them. For example, I use the Socratic and hypothetical 
methods of instruction. When I get a good student of color or a 
good woman student, I ask them to play the role of judge. I want 
these students to know that they do not have to playa subservient 
role; that no one in my class has to playa subservient role. I want 
them to know that not only in my class, but in life, they can become 
a judge like Judge Johnson, and that they too can ascend in the 
legal profession. 
The question is: What are you doing in your classroom to break 
down the myths, not only of society in general, but also of 
academia? Just to give you an example: The wife of one of my for­
mer research assistants is attending another law school, and he ex­
plained to me that she feels very frustrated because she raises her 
hand in class but is never called on. That is the worst thing you can 
do because you are saying, "this person does not exist." Well, we 
all exist, and we all have something to contribute. My students of 
color who are not on law review could end up working for legal 
services where they may be plaintiff's counsel in a class action. 
They all have something to contribute and they all have something 
to give. 
I think that the fact that I can teach commercial courses and 
have a high enrollment is very important because he or she who 
controls the money in this society controls a lot. If you do not con­
trol your own money, then it is questionable whether you are really 
empowered in this society. Therefore, I would like to think that my 
course, in addressing commercial financing, is linked to empower­
ment. I am from New York and I know that my colleague Ms. 
Brown is also from New York. There are a lot of black, Latino and 
Asian small businesses in New York. Well, is it not time that we 
started servicing this community so that it can have access to attor­
neys who are competent and are sensitive to its issues? 
You see, I generally view myself as a mentor to my students. 
My goal is to help them develop into good attorneys, to start engag­
ing them in the dialogue, and to show them that we are not only 
engaged in an academic experience but also in a lifelong experience 
of development. If someone says something that is really incorrect, 
but they are acting in good faith, I will say, "Well, would you really 
say that to a judge? Would you really say that in that manner?" I 
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do this because I want my students to know that in a couple of 
months they will be getting paid for this and that when they make 
mistakes, it is not going to be a matter of getting an A or a B in my 
course. Litigation is a zero sum game, either you win or you lose, 
unless you settle. 
I do not raise the topic of race in class because, as Ms. Brown 
said, no one files a statistical check concerning race or ethnicity 
when you file a bankruptcy petition. You really would not want 
that because you would not want a judge to have access to that type 
of information. But the one thing I can discuss is the issue of class, 
and the reasons certain rules are made. One of the things that I 
bring to the discussion is public choice theory. Public choice theory 
discusses who makes the rules and why those rules are made. It 
discusses the nature of the legislative process because, after all, the 
voluminous statutes I deal with do not appear in the United States 
Code accidentally. They appear there because they perpetuate cer­
tain classes and certain economic groups. One of the things I try to 
say to my students is, "Imagine you are in a fictional country and 
you are making rules for commercial law. How would you make 
those particular rules and who would want them?" This exercise 
prompts the students to think about class and class structure. 
The one thing I try to do, and I think this is more important 
outside the classroom, is to explore the possibilities. I try to tell 
people, "if you have a dream, pursue that dream," because I want 
students to know that they do not have to settle for mediocrity. 
They can put their best foot forward and eventually they can be­
come judges, United States Attorneys, and they can also clerk. I 
think one of the problems is that there are not enough minority law 
students who become clerks, even though they have the capability. 
So, I try to be a mentor to them, and to encourage their aspirations. 
There is a point that Ms. Brown and I both talked about: We 
have a schizophrenic identity because we are people of color, yet 
we teach in the business area. If I have one area of resentment it is 
that I do not want to be told how to think about certain issues. Let 
me be an individual and respect me as an individual. That is why I 
am in the academy. You can only tell me what to think if you have 
hired me as your attorney and I am your advocate. In that circum­
stance I breach my fiduciary duty to you if I take an opposing posi­
tion. The reason I have become an academic is that I am able to 
have academic freedom to engage in serious intellectual discussion. 
I think that we, as people of color, are in a bind at times because we 
are told that we cannot take a certain position because it may not 
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be the "liberal" position. The real question is, what is the intellec­
tually correct position? The same issue arises with respect to aca­
demic support of people of color on law school faculties. 
Sometimes you are the "Lone Ranger," but the question is whether 
you want to be the "Lone Ranger" or sacrifice your soul? That 
dilemma is something that we face all the time, and that is why 
conferences like this are so important. Here, we have the ability to 
garner the support of our colleagues and discuss these issues in a 
free manner. I thank you for this opportunity, and I thank you for 
listening to me. 
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ROBERT P. WASSON, JR.* 

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY PANELIST ROBERT P. 

WASSON, JR., ON SPLIT PERSONALITIES: 





OF THE LAW** 

Good morning. My name is Bob Wasson, and I would like to 
thank the organizers of the First Annual Northeastern People of 
Color Legal Scholarship Conference for inviting me to serve as a 
panelist on "Split Personalities: Teaching and Scholarship in Non­
Stereotypical Areas of the Law." To that end, I have been asked to 
make some introductory remarks. , 
Like the topic for our discussion, I, too, share a split legal per­
sonality, with one side of that personality in "stereotypical" areas of 
the law and the other in "non-stereotypical" areas of the law. The 
"stereotypical" aspect of my legal personality is reflected in the fact 
that I share the "stereotypical" background of law school teachers 
by having graduated from Harvard Law Schoo1.1 I wanted to be a 
litigator and clerked as a summer associate at two "stereotypical" 
large corporate law firms: Kirkland & Ellis in Chicag02 and Willkie, 
Farr & Gallagher in New York. My "stereotypical" experience con­
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1976, Harvard Col­
lege; J.D., 1979, Harvard Law School; Fulbright Lecturer, 1991-92, Faculty of Law, Uni­
versity of Nairobi, Kenya. 
** The following version of the author's remarks has been edited and footnoted 
by the author. 
1. See Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profes­
sion: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
191, 227 (1991) (reporting that during the 1988-89 academic year, 13.0% of all law 
school faculty had graduated from Harvard); id. at 194 & n.19 ("Five of the nation's 175 
law schools [Harvard, Yale, COlumbia, Chicago, and Michigan] graduated nearly one­
third of all law professors teaching today."); Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile 
of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501,507 
(finding that 13.9% of all law professors teaching during the 1975-76 school year had 
graduated from Harvard Law School); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The 
Double Minority; Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of 
Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2299, 2323 (1992) ("More than one sixth of the 
[minority] men (15.8%) and women (15.9%) graduated from Harvard Law School, the 
largest supplier of law school faculty members in the country."). Merritt and Reskin 
report that their findings were remarkably consistent with these earlier studies. In their 
full population, including both minority and white professors, 13.3% of the faculty 
members had graduated from Harvard. See id. at 2323 n.95. 
2. At the time I clerked at Kirkland, during the summer of 1977, it was reported 
to be the sixth largest law firm in the country with 160 attorneys between its Chicago 
and Washington, D.C. offices. 
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tinued upon graduation from law school by working as a litigation 
associate at Reuben & Proctor in Chicago, a spin-off of Kirkland & 
Ellis, and later, at another large corporate law firm, Goodwin, 
Procter & Hoar in Boston, my home town.3 When I arrived at Suf­
folk, I was asked to teach two "stereotypical" law school courses, 
Federal Civil Procedure and Federal Courts, which, fortunately, re­
lated directly to my area of practice. 
The "non-stereotypical" aspect of my legal personality is re­
flected in the fact that I teach Jurisprudence,4 Legal Philosophy,5 
and a course on Sexual Orientation and the Law.6 In 1992, I served 
as Chair of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") 
Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues. I was also appointed by 
the AALS to serve on a "Working Group" to draft guidelines for 
implementing an AALS bylaw barring member schools from dis­
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Finally, almost all of 
my scholarly writings have been in this area.7 
I have only a few points to make, first, because the excellent 
3. Having grown up as an Air Force "brat," the term "home town" is somewhat 
of a misnomer. However, to the extent that I have lived in the Boston area since 1963, 
with the exception of two years in Chicago and another in Kenya, Boston is the closest 
that I have to a horne town. 
4. This course grew out of my experience as a Fulbright Lecturer with the Faculty 
of Law of the University of Nairobi, Kenya, in 1991 to 1992, where I taught Jurispru­
dence in a seminar format to a small group of graduate students (including a retired 
member of the Kenya High Court), and to 170 undergraduates in a lecture format. As 
most of you are undoubtedly aware, with the exception of the United States and Can­
ada, law is an undergraduate concentration. 
5. Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy are essentially the same course. As stated 
in Cohen and Cohen's Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy: 
Jurisprudence, as the jurist's quest for a systemic vision that will order and 
illumine the dark realities of the law, and legal philosophy, conceived as the 
philosopher's effort to understand the legal order and its role in human life, 
have come close enough together in our land and our generation to warrant a 
unified approach to these two overlapping fields. 
CoHEN AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, at xvi 
(Philip Shuchman ed., 2d ed. 1979). 
6. In order to reduce any student anxiety that might be created in having a course 
entitled "Sexual Orientation and the Law" on their law school transcripts, the course is 
listed in the law school catalogue as "Civil RightsINon-Traditional Families." This step 
was taken with the advice and counsel of the law school Registrar. 
7. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Overview ofAIDS Discrimination Law after Arline, 
in 4 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 225 (Bar­
bara M. Wolvovitz ed., 1988); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Law and Development in the Third 
World: Ensuring Protection for the Rights of Criminal Offenders, in 1 LAW AND DEVEL· 
OPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 184 (Yash Vyas et al. eds., 1994); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., 
The AIDS Crisis as an Impetus to Law Reform in the United States and Kenya, 17 SUF. 
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1 (1994); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under 
Federal, State, and Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221 (1987). 
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comments of my fellow panelists make an extensive elaboration of 
my points unnecessary, and second, because it is important that 
members of the audience be given sufficient time to pose questions 
to the panel. To begin with, one needs to write, period. In this 
regard, it makes no difference whether one writes in traditional or 
non-traditional areas of the law.8 There are two reasons for this. 
First, if you wish to advance at your present institution, you need to 
write, and there is no substitute for it.9 As Professor Derrick Bell 
so succinctly stated: 
Of course, the sense of many in the law school community 
that teachers of color gained their jobs by virtue of affirmative 
action policies rather than by meeting traditional measures of 
merit does not deter assignment of every imaginable representa­
tional role. "We knew you would want to serve on this commit­
tee, work with the minority students on their annual conference, 
speak to this black student who is having trouble with torts, and 
mediate the differences between the minority students and Pro­
fessor X who inadvertently told a racist joke in class." 
The list is endless and would easily occupy the full time of an 
assistant dean. And yet such extracurricular duties are seen as 
part of the minority teacher's job ... until, of course, the time 
arrives to evaluate the teacher for promotion and tenure. Then, 
the entire focus of review is on the quality of the teaching and 
8. But see Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal 
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992) (highlighting the inherently subjective nature 
of evaluating legal scholarship). 
9.· One of my colleagues was the only person of color on a law faculty of 50. This 
person was placed on a university-wide affinnative action committee and was exten­
sively involved with the recruitment and retention of minority students and with serving 
as an official and unofficial advisor to minority organizations and students. Neverthe­
less, this individual received no credit for these activities when the time came for pro­
motion from assistant professor to associate professor to full professor. 
1\\'0 other professors of color at another law school were similarly saddled with 
minority-related activities. In addition, they served on such weighty faculty committees 
as faculty hiring and curriculum. One even served as chair of a faculty committee even 
though this person was untenured. Notwithstanding the fact that both were popular 
with their colleagues and received good student evaluations, neither received tenure. 
However, the reason given to me for the denials was that one had produced no schol­
arly writings and the other had produced only a final draft for which publication in a 
middle-ranked law review was pending. It was reported further that his piece was criti­
cized by colleagues who taught in the individual's area of expertise for being "unorigi­
nal" and for having "gone over well-plowed ground." One might ask how many of us 
produce an initial piece of the originality of a Harvard Law Review Supreme Court 
Forward. One might also ask how original or insightful were the original pieces of the 
critics. See Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1152-53 
(1990) (stating that many law schools consider service to the law school and to the 
broader community as the least important tenure criterion). 
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writing. Either no allowances are made for the compromises to 
scholarly activity resulting from time devoted to racial represen­
tational roles, or the estimates made for such activity wholly un­
derestimate both the time and energy expended in trying to 
compensate single-handedly for the school's inability to create a 
decent learning environment for students who for so many years 
were entirely excluded or admitted under the token policies now 
utilized to hire black and brown faculty.10 
Second, if you wish to transfer to another institution, you must 
have scholarly writings out there. It doesn't matter that one is Mr. 
or Ms. Chips in the classroom.l1 One is simply not going to get a 
lateral hire on the basis of one's classroom teaching. It is sort of 
like the old philosophical question: "If a tree falls in the woods and 
no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?" The answer is 
that if there is no one there to hear it, "Who cares?" 
Classroom teaching has no lasting reputation beyond the fad­
ing recollections of present and former students who actually heard 
it. Over time, those memories fade and soon there is nothing left. 
Scholarly writings, by contrast, have an immortality that is con­
tained in the index to legal periodicals, Lexis, and Westlaw.12 
There are three identifiable approaches to scholarly writing, 
which are not mutually exclusive. The first is to write generally in 
the area or areas in which one teaches in order to develop a reputa­
tion and expertise in a field of law. The second is to write generally 
in the area or areas in which one has an interest. One may do so for 
personal satisfaction or in order to develop a reputation and exper­
tise in a field of law. The third is to write specifically on the issue or 
issues that one sees as being financially remunerative. This mayor 
may not be in the area in which one teaches. It mayor may not be 
. to. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law 
Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L.J. 319, 320-21 (1986); see also Richard Delgado, 
Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 
349, 355-56 (1989) (describing the almost "intolerable" demands for the one or two 
minority faculty at law schools to be available to any and all minority students and 
minority issues). 
11. See JAMES HILTON, GOODBYE MR. CHIPS (J934). This classic story of a Brit­
ish schoolteacher who becomes a strict authoritarian in the classroom only to later 
regain his natural compassion as an instructor was made into an academy award win­
ning motion picture. See GOODBYE MR. CHIPS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
12. As a gay African-American man without children, I look upon my scholarly 
writings as my children. Like children who grow up to have children, and so forth, they 
are a legacy that continues forever. Similarly, so long as the index to legal periodicals, 
Lexis, Westlaw, or similar indices exist, I, too, shall have achieved a form of 
immortality. 
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in an area in which one has a particular interest. Since the goal is to 
make oneself marketable, one would certainly wish to develop a 
reputation or expertise in such a field. . 
In my case, I could have written in the areas in which I first 
started teaching-Federal Civil Procedure and Federal Courts­
which were the areas in which I had practiced prior to teaching law. 
In fact, I had surmised that Judge Bork would· be nominated by 
President Reagan for the next appointment to the Supreme Court. 
As it turned out, Judge Bork was nominated just as I completed the 
first draft on an article that compared his judicial philosophy on the 
bench to that expressed in his famous Indiana Law Journal article 
on neutral principles of law.13 Once Judge Bork's nomination to 
the Court was rejected by the Senate,14 the article was mooted. I 
thought of turning to a more "stereotypical" piece, like the one on 
Bork, but came to be drawn to writing on discrimination based on 
HIV status as more and more of my friends, associates, and former 
lovers began to die from AIDS.1s 
Some may ask whether or not there are any disadvantages to 
writing in a "non-stereotypical'" area. In my view, there aren't 
any,16 As people of color, we already have several strikes against 
us. First, notwithstanding the dearth of minorities at most law 
schools,11 and the large pool of qualified minorities,1S it is claimed 
13. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). This article, in tum, was based on an even more famous piece by 
Herbert Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Wechsler's article responded to Judge Learned 
Hand's Lectures at the Harvard Law School in which judicial review was legitimized as 
merely a necessary inference to "'prevent the defeat of the venture at hand.'" Id. at 1-3 
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (reprint of the Oliver Wen­
dell Holmes Lectures)). 
14. See Linda Greenhouse, Bark's Nomination is Rejected 58-42; Reagan 'Sad
dened,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1987, at 1. 
15. At this point I don't know how many have died of AIDS. I stopped counting 
once the number reached 50. 
16. But see Rubin, supra note 8 (highlighting the subjectivity inherent in evaluat­
ing legal scholarship). 
17. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women 
on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 539 (1988). Chused reports 
that: 
Racial tokenism is alive and well at American law schools. About one-third of 
all schools in this study have no black faculty members. Another third have 
just one. Less than a tenth have more than three. In percentage terms, less 
than fifteen percent of law schools have more than six percent of their faculty 
positions held by black people. 
Id. 	(footnote omitted). 
Chused adds that "[o]nly about one-fourth of law schools surveyed, a total of 
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that we simply are not "out there."19 We are viewed as incompe­
tent affirmative action hires who diminish the likelihood that com­
petent white men will be hired.20 This is particularly so with respect 
to minority women.21 Second, too often the term minority is 
thirty-nine schools, have more than six percent of their faculty positions occupied by 
minority persons." ld. at 540. He concludes: 
There were only thirty-five more tenured black professors in 1987 at the 144 
non-minority-operated schools in the sample than there were in 1981. This 
represents an increase of only about one-quarter of a person per institution. 
The number of tenure track black professors increased by only sixteen in the 
same time period, or about one-ninth of a person per institution. 
ld. at 540-41. 
18. See Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the Academy: Of Poets and 
Kings, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 338 (1992) (addressing the "myth" of a lack of quali­
fied minority law professors); Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1. Merritt and Reskin re­
ported that more than one-sixth of minority hires graduated from Harvard Law School 
and that nearly another sixth graduated from Yale Law School. See id. at 2323. 
Roughly 20% of the minorities served on the main law review at their school and an­
other 15% served on the secondary law review. See id. at 2324. Finally, nearly 30% of 
the minorities clerked for a judge following law school, with roughly 25% of these hav­
ing been with a federal judge. See id. at 2325. 
By way of comparison, approximately one-third of all law professors graduated 
from Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, or Michigan. See Borthwick & Schau, supra 
note I, at 194 & n.19. Approximately 50% of men and 40% of women hired as law 
faculty during the 1980s had law review experience. See id. at 205, 206. Finally, 36% of 
the men and 44% of the women hired as law faculty during the 1980s had some kind of 
judicial clerkship following graduation from law school. See id. at 208. 
19. See Chused, supra note 17, at 555 (arguing that aggressive commitment must 
be undertaken by American law schools to recruit and hire minority and women 
faculty); Bell, supra note 10, at 321 (no aggressive search for minority candidates is 
made until the law school administration is pressured to do so by minority students and 
liberal white faculty, and once such an effort is undertaken, qualified minorities are 
miraculously found). 
20. See Karen Skelton, Bay Area Law Schools Hiring More Women and Minori­
ties, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Mar. 7, 1991, at 1 (quoting Dean Paul Brest of Stanford Law 
School, who stated: "It's not a good day for white males. I'm glad I have my job 
here."). Such a comment might only be partially justified as an overreaction to those 
who have deemed the dearth of minorities to justify racial quotas in the hiring process. 
See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, The Need for Self-Imposed Quotas in Academic Employment, 
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 137; Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law 
Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 429 (1986). 
21. See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1. Notwithstanding the assumption that 
women of color would command a premium in law teaching because they "simultane­
ously satisfy student and faculty demands for female professors and for minority ones," 
id. at 2300, Merritt and Reskin discovered that minority women who joined law school 
faculties between the fall of 1986 and the spring of 1991 "began teaching at significantly 
lower ranks than the minority men, obtained positions at significantly less prestigious 
schools, and were significantly more likely to teach low-status courses like legal writing 
or trusts and estates." Id. at 2301. Furthermore, "[njone of these disparities can be 
adequately explained through differences in credentials, age, work experience, geo­
graphic constraints, or family ties. Instead, law schools seem to treat minority women 
less favorably than minority men." ld; see also Tobias, supra note 9, at 1145. Tobias 
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viewed as synonymous with African-American to the disadvantage 
of non-African-American minorities.22 Third, law schools are often 
hostile environments, leading to the high turnover of minority 
faculty for more congenial environments.23 Finally, because stu­
dents often view the minority law professor as an affirmative action 
hire, h~ or she is not accorded the presumption of competence ac­
corded to white professors.24 As a result, the minority law profes­
sor faces a larger risk of being trashed in the student evaluation 
indicated that problems of recruiting and tenuring are not limited to minority females 
by pointing out that approximately 20% of law schools, particularly the so-called "elite" 
law schools, comprise over 25% of a "laggard group" of schools where the percentage 
of women during the period from 1986 to 1987 was substantially less than the 1981 to 
1982 average of 12% female. Id. at 1145 & n.ll. Tobias identified these "elite" law 
schools as the same ones listed by Richard Chused in his study published in the Univer­
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review, namely: University of California at Berkeley, Univer­
sity of California at Los Angeles, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell 
University, Duke University, Georgetown University, George Washington University, 
Harvard University, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of Minne­
sota, New York University, Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, Uni­
versity of Southern California, Stanford University, University of Texas, Vanderbilt 
University, University of Virginia, University of Wisconsin, and Yale University. See id. 
at 1145 n.12 (citing Chused, supra note 17, at 549 n.65); see also, Carl Tobias, Respect 
for Diversity: The Case of Feminist Legal Thought, 58 U. CiN. L. REV. 175 (1989) 
(listing Harvard University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University as having 
some particularly nasty battles over the granting of tenure to women). 
22. See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1, at 2316 ("Among the minority professors, 
73.5% were African American, 16.2% were Hispanic, 7.7% were Asian American, and 
1.7% were Native American."); see also Chused, supra note 17, at 538 (reporting that 
the Hispanic proportion of majority-run faculties went from 0.5% during the period 
from 1980 to 1981 to only 0.7% in 1986 to 1987, and that the proportion of other minor­
ities went from 0.5% to 1.0% during the same period); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: 
The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,51 (1994) 
("Whereas approximately 3.5% of law students are Asian American, only approxi­
mately 0.9% of law faculty are Asian American."); id. at 52 n.230 (in 1988, for example, 
only one out of 313 newly hired full-time facuIty members was Asian American); Mary 
Ann Brigantti-Hughes, Underrepresentation in Law Schools ofPuerto Ricans, Latinos is 
Appalling, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1992, at S4 ("Of the 5,700 law teachers in the 180 accred­
ited law schools in the nation, five are Puerto Rican, 20 are Mexican-American, and 10 
are other Latino."). 
23. See Chused, supra note 17, at 544-46. The alienation of minority faculty 
members may be illustrated, in part, by a comment made by Derrick Bell: 
It is not easy to describe the feeling of despair when the faculty rejects a quali­
fied teacher of color who you know full well they would quickly hire were you 
to suffer a heart attack and drop dead. "Is it," the minority teacher wonders, 
"that I am doing such a good job that they see no need to hire others like 
myself? Or is it, rather, that my performance is so poor that they refuse to hire 
anyone else for fear of making another serious mistake?" 
Bell, supra note 10, at 322; see also Harris, supra note 18, at 343. 
24. See Bell, supra note 10, at 320. 
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process2S or of having students complain about his or her teaching 
either directly to the professor26 or to the administration.27 These 
problems are exacerbated to the extent that the administration 
treats any and all complaints by white students against minority 
professors as legitimate,28 rationalizes student evaluations to serve 
a racist purpose,29 or dismisses unfavorable student evaluations of 
white tenure candidates favored by the administration and 
faculty.3D 
25. See Delgado, supra note to, at 361. 
26. See id. at 359 (discussing submission of a memorandum by a first-year white 
male student which reviewed the minority law teacher's classroom performance, noting 
his deficiencies and giving suggestions on how the teacher, who had come to law teach­
ing following an impressive career in law practice, could correct them); id. at 360 
(describing student delegation's visit to a Hispanic professor in which the professor was 
criticized both for moving too fast and for moving too slow through the course 
material). 
27. See id. at 353 n.14. Delgado described an incident in which Derrick Bell, a 
leading African-American scholar, 

taught Constitutional Law as a visiting professor to a section of first-year law 

students at Stanford. After a few weeks, the professor was invited to give a 

lecture in a noon "enrichment" series on constitutional law offered at the law 

school. Unknown to the professor, the faculty had initiated the series in re­






28. At three separate law schools with which the author is familiar, the Dean 
himself listens to student complaints by white students. He is sympathetic to their con­
cerns and indicates that the patient (the minority professor) does indeed suffer from a 
serious pathology and has a faint pulse, but that the situation will be monitored to 
. determine whether or not he or she will survive. 
29. At one law school, a minority tenure candidate's student evaluations were 
reviewed. The evaluations were generally good. The faculty then compared the evalua­
tions with those of other faculty who taught the first-year course. Although each 
faculty member receives a computer print-out of how their student evaluations compare 
to those of other faculty members as a whole, there is no official attempt to compare a 
professor's student evaluations to those of other professors who teach the same course. 
Furthermore, this law school's tenure policy did not even indicate that such compari­
sons would be made. Unless the minority tenure candidate was advised privately in 
advance that such a comparison would be made, she would have had no way of knowing 
that her generally good student evaluations would be used against her in this ad hoc 
manner. At this point, the fact that the minority professor's evaluations in the first year 
required course were marginally lower than those of colleagues who taught the same 
course was cited to urge a negative tenure vote. By contrast, a senior faculty member, 
convinced that the candidate was not properly teaching her upper-level elective, dis­
missed her uniformly superior student evaluations with the comment, "these are stu­
dents, they don't realize that they are not being taught anything." The woman was 
ultimately denied tenure by the faculty at this meeting. 
30. See Delgado, supra note 10, at 361 ("[W]hen white males get low numbers, 
they may be over-looked or explained away: 'Joe got poor numbers in Civil Procedure 
because he is so rigorous; and what do students know anyway?'''). 
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It should be added that the so-called "non-stereotypical" area 
in which I write is now so mainstream, and there are now so many 
straight men and women who write in it,31 that it would almost be 
tragic for someone who has an interest in it to avoid the area be­
cause it is just "too" non-stereotypical. 
Let me make just one final point. Mentoring is important. We 
all need support and encouragement instead of criticism. Unfortu­
nately, colleagues at your respective home institutions who will sit 
in judgment of you when it comes time for promotion and tenure 
will dismiss the fact that each page of your draft was marked "First 
Draft," and will forever damn you as the person who cannot write. 
To avoid this, I offer myself as someone willing to review your 
pieces. The fact that I don't teach in the area of your research 
should not be a problem.32 
Thank you for your time and enjoy the rest of the conference. 
31. For example, one of my colleagues, a married, straight, white man just com­
pleted an excellent law review article on using Title VII to fight same-sex sexual harass­
ment. Someone was prescient to name my AALS section the "Section on Gay & 
Lesbian Legal Issues" as opposed to the "Section for Gays & Lesbians" as an incredibly 
large portion of our membership is comprised of straight men and women for whom our 
concerns are leading edge and not fringe esoterica. 
32. Except for this paper, the author generally asks his father to review his drafts. 
The author's father was in the Air Force for 29 years and, thereafter, served for 15 years 
as vice-president of the New England region for a high-tech company. He is a non­
lawyer but a fairly intelligent person. He is also the author'S biggest fan. He has never 
failed to pick out faulty logic, strident emotionalism, and mistakes of sixth grade gram­
mar that the author is wont to make. 
